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Social Trust and Grassroots Governance in Rural China 
(Abstract) 
The relationship between social trust and governance has been one of the focal points of the 
academic and policy-making communities.  Empirical studies on this relationship, however, have 
focused mostly on democracies.  The scarcity of such studies in authoritarian countries has left 
many important questions unanswered:  Is social trust associated with effective governance only 
in democratic settings?  Can social trust improve the quality of governance in non-democracies 
as well?  Drawing on data from 2005 China General Social Survey²a representative survey 
conducted nationwide at both the individual- and village-level in rural China, this paper attempts 
to answer these questions empirically by examining the relationship between social trust and the 
quality of governance in rural China.  The findings reveal that different types of social trust²
particularized trust and generalized trust²correspond with different effects in rural governance:  
wKHUHDVYLOODJHUV¶WUXVWLQSHRSOHZKRPWKH\knew personally was positively and significantly 
associated with the provision of various public goods and services, their trust in strangers had 
virtually no impact on rural governance.   
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Social Trust and Grassroots Governance in Rural China 
 
1. Introduction 
 Ever since the late 1950s and particularly after the rise of social capital studies, the 
relationship between social trust and grassroots governance has attracted enormous attention 
from both the academic and policy-making communities.  A large part of the literature suggests 
WKDWVRFLDOWUXVWDVWKH³OXEULFDQWRIVRFLHW\´LVindispensable for effective democratic 
governance at various levels.1  Subsequent empirical studies further confirm that in democratic 
countries, higher levels of social trust usually come in tandem with more active government and 
more cooperative communities, which in turn lead to better performance of grassroots 
governance.2 
 However, in contrast to the consensus achieved in democratic settings, researchers are 
less certain about the relationship between social trust and governance in authoritarian countries, 
and different, if not contradictory, findings have been reported.  Many VFKRODUVIROORZLQJ'DKO¶V
SURSRVLWLRQWKDW³PXWXDOWUXVWIDYRUVSRO\DUFK\«ZKLOHH[WUHPHGLVWUXVWIDYRUVKHJHPRQ\´
have argued that social trust is intrinsically democratic, and thus the relationship between social 
trust and the authoritarian system of governance is conflictual.3  Another group of scholars, 
however, have stated that the relationship between social trust and non-democratic systems of 
governance is not necessarily conflictual, but can also be complementary.4  Laitin, for example, 
has suggested that to argue social trust is intrinsically democratic runs the risk of conflating 
³GHPRFUDF\´with ³HIIHFWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQV´DQGLWFRXOGEHZHOOWKHFDVHWKDWVRFLDOWUXVW³is more 
LPSRUWDQWIRUHIIHFWLYHFRPPXQLVWLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDQGHPRFUDWLFRQHV´5   
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 Apart from the context of varying regimes, the relationship between social trust and 
governance is further confounded by the multi-dimensionality of social trust.  Increasingly, 
scholars have found that the use of the term social trust depends on the identities of participants 
in the trust relationship, and individuals tend to place different levels of trust in people of 
different relational categories.6  Different forms of social trust apparently correspond with 
different effects in governance.7   
 Unfortunately, until now few empirical studies have directly tested the relationship 
between the different forms of social trust and grassroots governance in authoritarian settings.8  
The scarcity of such studies has left several important questions unanswered:  Is social trust 
associated with effective grassroots governance only in democratic settings?  Can social trust 
improve the quality of governance in non-democracies as well?  If so, how do different kinds of 
social trust affect grassroots governance?  Based on data from a representative survey conducted 
in rural China (see Appendix A), this study attempts to answer these questions empirically by 
examining the relationship between social trust and the local provision of public goods in rural 
China. 
 For at least two reasons, contemporary rural China can serve as a critical case.  The first 
reason is that the aforementioned debates are particularly acute in the Chinese contexts.  On the 
one hand, many scholars have argued that social distrust, either derived IURP&KLQD¶VWUDGLWLRQDO
culture or caused E\0DR¶VWRWDOLWDULDQUXOHLVSHUYDVLYHLQ&KLQDDQGWKLVSHUYDVLYHGLVWUXVW
makes &RPPXQLVW3DUW\¶V&&3QRQ-democratic governance possible and sustainable.9  On the 
other hand, studies based on cross-national surveys, such as the East Asia Barometer and the 
World Value Survey, have suggested that China is one of the most trusting societies in the 
world,10 and this large reservoir of social trust is one of the reasons that governance by the CCP 
 4 
is resilient and effective.11  Unfortunately, until now there have been virtually no empirical 
studies that have directly tested these contradictory views.  Some scholars have even excluded 
China as the ³&KLQDRXWOLHU´IURPanalysis.12  Second, with regard to local governance, China has 
undergone rapid changes and uneven development for the past three decades.  Such changes and 
development provide an ideal opportunity to examine the impacts of various factors on rural 
governance.  Although many researchers have examined such factors as village elections and 
levels of economic development on grassroots governance,13 few have incorporated social trust 
to explain the variations in China¶s rural governance.  With an awareness of these factors, this 
study can significantly advance our understanding of the relationship between social trust and 
grassroots governance in non-democratic societies.   
 In the following parts of this paper, we introduce the unique sociopolitical environment 
of rural governance in China, operationalize the concept of social trust in the Chinese setting, 
gauge the reservoir of social trust, and explore the effects of social trust on the public goods and 
services provided by village governments.  We then conclude with a discussion on the theoretical 
and political implications of the findings from this study.   
 
2. Rural Governance in China 
 In rural China, grassroots governance has undergone dramatic changes from the Mao era 
until the reform era.  In the Mao era, the functions of public goods provisions were largely 
carried out by the village party branches (VPBs).  The appointed party secretaries, who also 
monopolized critical collective resources, often took the leading role in providing basic public 
goods.  Therefore, throughout the pre-reform era, rural governance in China has been largely 
directed by the party-state.  Since the onset of the post-Mao reform, this mode of rural 
 5 
governance has become increasingly unsustainable.  After the decollectivization of agricultural 
production and abolishment of the commune system, party secretaries lost their direct control 
over collective properties, and as a result, their role in providing public goods has been severely 
weakened.14  Meanwhile, ordinary villagers were largely unable or unwilling to fill the gap in 
public goods provision.  Therefore, the de facto retreat of the party-state in the rural affairs has 
created a void IRUUXUDOSXEOLFJRRGVSURYLVLRQ$VQRWHGE\$VK³>Z@LWKVWDWHLQYHVtment in 
decline and no surge in voluntary investment by peasants, infrastructural decline became a 
VHULRXVSUREOHP´15  Since the introduction of tax-for-fee reform (TFR), the problem has turned 
to be even more acute.  The TFR was originally designed to reGXFHSHDVDQWV¶EXUGHQVby 
abolishing local fees.  However, since these fees were also used to fund local public services, the 
actual impacts of the TFR on village governance tend to be negative.16  Indeed, rural China 
experienced rapid deterioration in almost all the domains of public goods and services, ranging 
from primary education to public health.17   
 In recognition of this problem, the central government has made many efforts to adapt the 
grassroots government system to these sociopolitical changes.18  This new grassroots system for 
rural areas was anchored in the Village Committee (VC).  According to the Organic Law of 
Village Committees first promulgated in 1987, the VCs are supposed to be mass organizations of 
self-government at the grassroots level in the rural areas.  Elected by villagers, officials of VCs 
are responsible for administering rural socioeconomic and political affairs, particularly public 
goods provision.  The central government sees VCs as a critical means to rectify the deterioration 
of rural governance and public goods provision, since elected officials of VCs are supposed to 
enjoy greater support from villagers and act in a more accountable manner than the appointed 
cadres of the Mao era.  The final promulgation of the Organic Law in 1998 marked the 
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EHJLQQLQJRIWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSXVKIRUPRUHDXWRQRPRXV9&VDVDVROXWLRQWRWKH
deteriorating rural governance in China.  By 2004, when the survey was being conducted, most 
villages in China had already adopted VCs as the governing body of village affairs.   
 
3. Rural Public Goods Provision 
 Yet, under this new grassroots government system, how well are the public goods and 
services provided?  To answer this question, we focus on three categories of rural public goods 
and services: public health, social welfare, and infrastructure.19  There are at least two reasons to 
focus on these categories.  First, while these four categories do not exhaust all aspects of public 
goods provision, together they capture the major concerns of rural residents across various 
regions of &KLQDDQGKDYHDSURIRXQGLPSDFWRQRUGLQDU\YLOODJHUV¶TXDOLW\RIOLIHThe 
relevance and importance of these four categories to villagers¶ lives have been confirmed by 
many empirical studies of rural governance in China.20  Second, a focus on a single indicator 
might lead to highly biased conclusions about public goods provision.  For instance, a village 
with abundant water resources tends to spend less on irrigation systems than a village plagued by 
droughts.  Consequently, the multiple measures used in this study can yield a more accurate 
picture about the public goods provision in rural China. 
 In terms of specific measurements, we employ the percentage of households with tap 
water for public health, per capita village expenditure on social welfare (e.g., cash transferred to 
wubao household) in 2004, and per capita village expenditure on agricultural infrastructures 
(e.g., irrigation systems) (see Table 1).  It should be noted that the survey did not documented 
itemized information about the fund sources for each project.  Yet, as discussed DERYH&KLQD¶V
post-Mao reforms like the TFR generate strong disincentives for local governments to provide 
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public services.  Consequently, VCs have to take the initiative, and they rely mainly on fund 
voluntarily raised by peasants.  If voluntary fund are insufficient, VCs have to lobby upper-level 
governments and compete for limited government fund.  Therefore, larger village expenditures 
reflect better public good provision.  To further gauge the relative importance of public goods 
provision, we also include the ratio of total expenditure on these items to administrative cost.   
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of a set of four indicators of rural public goods.  
First, all four indicators of public goods provision varied substantially.  Take expenditure on 
village agricultural infrastructures per capita, for example.  Villages varied from a low of no 
investment at all to a high of 312.5 yuan of investment per capita, with a standard deviation of 
29.8 yuan.  On average, VCs spent 4.8 yuan per capita on investment in village infrastructures.  
Together, the mean and standard deviation suggest that the distribution of VC expenditure on 
infrastructures varies widely. 
[Table 1 is about here.] 
 Secondly, the results presented Table 1 are consistent with the findings about rural public 
goods provision from other surveys conducted during the same time period.  Take the percentage 
of households with tap water, for example.  According to a reporWUHOHDVHGE\&KLQD¶V Ministry 
of Health, in 2004 about 50 percent of households in rural China had tap water.  This statistics 
concurs with our finding that 46.7 percent of rural households had access to tap water.21  
 
4. Social Trust and Its Impacts on Governance 
4.1.  Reservoir of Social Trust in Rural China  
 How trustful are Chinese rural residents?  The conventional approach employed in 
survey-based research has been WRDVNUHVSRQGHQWVWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU³PRVWSHRSOHFDQEH
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WUXVWHG´,QDstudy of social trust in 55 countries, Delhey and Newton found that when this 
measure was used, China not only ranks more highly than any other Asian country, but also is 
one of the few countries that can be categorized as a high-trust society.22  However, these 
findingVDUHLQVKDUSFRQWUDGLFWLRQWRPDQ\&KLQDVFKRODUV¶REVHUYDWLRQV23  For instance, Pye has 
argued that ODFNLQJ³ERQGLQJDWDPRUHJHQHUDOL]HGOHYHO«Chinese society showed little social 
LQWHJUDWLRQEH\RQGIDPLO\FODQDQGSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSV´24  How can we explain this 
discrepancy?   
 In fact, the contradiction between these studies reveals an important question overlooked 
by survey-based studies, that is, the multi-dimensionality of social trust.25  Misztal, for example, 
has argued that a continuum of WUXVWH[LVWVPRYLQJIURP³WKLFN´WR³WKLQ´ZKLOHWKLFNWUXVW
originates from close personal exchanges, thin trust results from less intensive social interactions 
such as those of voluntary associations.26  Yet the most widely used categorization of social 
trust²generalized trust vs. particularized trust²was proposed by Uslaner.27  Individuals with 
higher levels of generalized trust have a larger radius of trust and EHOLHYH³PRVWSHRSOHVKDUH
common values and are willing to trust strangers who may outwardly seem quite different from 
themselves.´28  On the contrary, individuals with higher levels of particularized trust only people 
known from close and intensive personal interactions, like family members, close friends, or 
members of close-knit groups. 
 The distinction between different categories of social trust is essential to our discussion 
on the relationship of social trust to grassroots governance.  First, although there have been few 
survey-based studies, scholars apparently agree that the different types of social trust may 
variably affect governance.  For instance, it has been suggested that only generalized trust 
promotes governance effectiveness,29 and particularized trust either has no effect or has negative 
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consequences for governance.30  Second, as noted by Sturgis and Smith, many conflicting 
findings in the literature of social trust stem IURPUHVSRQGHQWV¶DQGUHVHDUFKHUV¶QRQ-uniform 
interpretations of the phrase ³PRVWSHRSOHFDQEHWUXVWHG´31  People with different 
socioeconomic backgrounds and liIHH[SHULHQFHVPD\LQWHUSUHW³PRVWSHRSOH´LQGUDPDWLFDOO\
GLIIHUHQWZD\V,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHLQKHUHQWO\YDJXHWHUP³PRVWSHRSOH´XVHGLQWKHTXHVWLRQIDLO
to achieve both the reliability and validity required in cross-national studies.32   
 To avoid the confusion caused by over-generalized terms and undefined social categories, 
wHDGRSWDVHWRIPHDVXUHPHQWVEDVHGRQWKHGLIIHUHQWVRFLDOFDWHJRULHVRI³PRVWSHRSOH´
Specifically, we asked respondents the following question:  ³*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJZRXOG\Ru 
SOHDVHWHOOPHKRZWUXVWZRUWK\WKHVHFDWHJRULHVRISHRSOHDUH"´7KHUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWR
assess their levels of trust in people of six important social categories in rural China: relatives 
and close friends (qinyou), neighbors (jinlin), non-neighbors (linju yiwai de tongcun jumin), 
villagers sharing the same surnames (tongcun tongxing renshhi), villagers of different surnames 
(tongcun fei tongxing renshhi), and strangers (moshengren).33  For each category of people, 
respondents were asked to assess their levels of trustworthiness on a 5-SRLQWVFDOHZKHUH³´
VWDQGVIRU³PRVWRIWKHPFDQQRWEHWUXVWHG´DQG³´IRU³PRVWRIWKHPFDQEHWUXVWHG´ 
 Table 2 presents the distributions of all the items of social trust on the basis of the six 
social categories in rural China.  We can draw three important findings from the distribution.  
First, the overall results of the distribution tend to confirm the views held by many China 
scholars: the majority of our Chinese rural respondents apparently trusted people they know 
personally.34  This result is a clear indication of a high level of particularized trust.  Specifically, 
the number of respondents who indicated that either more than half or most of the members of 
the five non-stranger relational categories can be trusted ranges from a low of 67 percent for trust 
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in non-neighboring villagers to a high of 91 percent for trust in relatives.  This finding is further 
reinforced by the fact that the mean scores of all the five items of social trust in non-stranger 
cateJRULHVDUHZHOODERYH³.´  Together these findings suggest that the respondents in rural 
China have high levels of trust in people of non-stranger categories, encompassing relatives and 
all the other villagers.   
[Table 2 is about here.] 
 A second important finding that we can draw from the results presented in Table 2 is that 
rural residents in China are generally suspicious of people they do not know personally and are 
reluctant to extend their trust to strangers.  Specifically, the mean score of the item of trust in 
VWUDQJHUVZDVRQO\ZHOOEHORZ³.´  Moreover, the survey also reveals that only less than 6 
percent of all respondents agreed that either more than half or most of the strangers can be 
trusted.  Such a finding implies that distrust in strangers is prevalent in rural China; most rural 
residents are not willing to extend their radius of trust to people whom they do not know 
personally.   
 Third, the juxtaposition of the two findings above clearly reveals a sharp contrast in 
Chinese rural rHVLGHQWV¶WUXVWLQdifferent groups of people.  This confirms our earlier suggestion 
regarding the complexity of social trust.  Instead of being a monolithic whole, social trust 
differentiates into a variety of specific instances of trusts in the course of daily social 
interactions.  We use factor analysis to sort out the latent subdimensions of social trust.  The 
results are reported in Table 3.  Two factors, composed of all the six trust items, emerge from the 
factor analysis.  These two factors deal neatly with particularized trust and generalized trust 
respectively: the factor of particularized trust encompasses the five items of trust in non-
strangers (relatives, non-/neighbors, and villagers of same/different surnames); only trust in 
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strangers accounted for the factor of generalized trust.  Together, the two factors explain two 
thirds (68.4 percent) of the item variance among all the six items of social trust.   
[Table 3 is about here.] 
 From the results of this factor analysis, two important findings stand out.  First, the 
results presented in Table 3 confirm that the most important distinction between different types 
of social trust is the one between particularized trust and generalized trust.  Specifically, although 
in this study we employ six trust items that encompass various relational categories in rural 
China, we ended up with only two components after the factor analysis, which is highly 
consistent with earlier findings reported from China and other countries.35  Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that ordinary Chinese rural residents markedly differentiate between trust 
in fellow villagers and trust in strangers. 
 A second finding is that particularized trust in rural China seems to be less particularistic 
than many scholars have argued.36  SpecifiFDOO\DOWKRXJKWKHDYHUDJH&KLQHVHYLOODJHUV¶WUXVWLQ
relatives was slightly higher than the other four categories of particularized trust (i.e., villagers of 
same surname, villagers of different surnames, neighboring villagers, and non-neighboring 
villagers), the gap is neither substantial nor statistically significant.  In other words, the ordinary 
Chinese villagers generally trust their fellow villagers equally, regardless of their clan or lineage 
identities or whether or not the villagers are their neighbors. 
 The lopsidedness between particularized and generalized trust certainly can be explained 
by sociodemographic factors like the size of community.  Huhe, for instance, finds that the 
village size is negatively associated with the level of particularized trust in rural China. 37  Yet, 
many other scholars emphasize the role of nondemocratic rule.38  A defining characteristic of the 
Communist rule is the absorption and destruction of social groups.  Through political campaigns 
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like the Cultural Revolution, peasants in China have been torn from their lineages and even 
direct families, and the atomized masses are the easy subjects of mobilization by the party-state.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that peasants in China generally trust their fellow villagers equally. 
[Figure 1 is about here.] 
 From a comparative perspective, the boundary between generalized and particularized 
trust can be conceptualized and thus compared DVWKH³UDGLXVRIWUXVW´39  As suggested by 
Delhey, Netwon, and Welzel, we can examine the trust radius by calculating the associations of 
³WUXVWLQPRVWSHRSOH´ with particularized and generalized trust.40  A strong association with 
particularized trust then indicates a small radius of trust.  Using data from the fifth wave of 
WVS, we are able to compare the trust radius of China in a global setting.  As revealed in Figure 
1, China occupies the upper left corner and is quite similar to countries like Vietnam, Thailand, 
and South Korea.  Not only are these societies high in trust level and narrow in trust radius.  
More interestingly, they all have experienced or are experiencing nondemocratic rules.  In light 
of this, an examination of the case of China can significantly advance our understanding about 
the relationship between social trust and grassroots governance in non-democratic settings.   
 
4.2. Impacts of Different Forms of Social Trust on Grassroots Governance  
 Thus far, we have found that social trust is a multi-dimensional concept, encompassing 
two sub-dimensions²particularized trust and generalized trust.  Is the provision of public goods 
in rural China influenced by these two types of social trust?  And, if so, to what extent?   
 Until now there has been virtually no consensus on how different forms of social trust 
effect grassroots governance, not to mention in non-democratic settings.  Many earlier studies, 
mostly conducted in the Western settings, have proposed that generalized trust, as a key 
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component of bridging social capital, could improve performance of local government through a 
variety of channels.41  Knack, for example, suggests two possible mechanisms.42  First, trust can 
influence the community performance by shaping the governmental accountability.  Generalized 
trust, with a greater emphasis on strangers, helps to broaden governmental accountability, which 
in turQPDNHVJRYHUQPHQW³UHVSRQVLYHWRFLWL]HQVDWODUJHUDWKHUWKDQWRQDUURZLQWHUHVWV´
Second, generalized trust improves performance of communities by forging the convergence of 
political preferences.  Trusting a stranger may facilitate agreement where political preferences 
are polarized, which in turn may help forge various forms of sociopolitical cooperation.  In light 
of this, one could hypothesize that generalized trust is positively associated with local public 
goods provision in rural China. 
 On the other hand, the impacts of particularized trust are found to be ambivalent.  Putnam, 
for example, argues that particularized trust is an integral part of social capital (i.e., bonding 
social capital), and it is a proper balance between generalized and particularized trust that 
improves grassroots governance.43  However, many other scholars find that particularized trust is 
WKH³GDUN-VLGHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDO´DQGJLYHs rise to malign phenomena like ethnocentricism and 
organized crimes.  Moreover, when the democratic rule is weak, the detrimental effects of 
particularized trust can be further amplified.  CallaKDQ¶VVWXG\RQHOHFWLRQVLQ7KDLODQGIRU
example, reveals that particularized trust in fact facilitates political corruptions like vote 
buying.44  Similarly in Russia, Rose finds that blat, as a form of particularized trust, severely 
undermines formal rules and institutions.45 
 However, these propositions are formulated in country-based studies, shedding little light 
on crossnational variations in radius of social trust.  The quality of governance varies not only 
because of changing levels of particularized and generalized trust, but also depending on varying 
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radiuses of trust.  Given different trust radiuses, the same changes to particularized and 
generalized trust are not likely to have identical impacts on local governance.  Instead of 
focusing solely on the absolute effects of their relative levels, we should also pay attention to the 
varying boundaries between particularized and generalized trust. 
 In rural China, particularized trust encompasses virtually every member in the village 
community.  The large radius of particularized trust avoids its potential negative effects (e.g., 
social exclusion), but still renders strong positive bonding effects.  Particularized trust in rural 
China thus can help overcome the collective action problem of voluntary investment by peasants.  
Different from formal institutional arrangements, social cooperation in public goods provision 
lacks third-party scrutiny.  Therefore, how to monitor and punish the free-riders is a key problem 
faced by the participants of social cooperation.  Particularized trust with a large radius provides 
an effective solution to this monitoring problem.  Specifically, when individuals trust each other, 
fewer resources will be spent on monitoring free-riders.  In addition, with a large reservoir of 
social trust, the risk of detection and punishment serves as a deterrent against free-riding 
behavior.  Free-riders are not only more easily identified, but also face severe social sanctions 
ranging from community boycott to ostracism.  In other words, with intensive particularized trust, 
social controls tend to be strong and misbehavior can be easily sanctioned.  Anecdotal studies 
conducted in China suggest that, rather than generalized trust, particularized trust is strongly 
associated with communal cooperation.46  Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai, and Ming Xia, for instance, 
find that when there is a large reservoir of particularized trust, villagers in rural China are more 
likely to cooperate with each other to provide basic public goods.47  As we noted above, few 
empirical studies, and even fewer analyses of nondemocratic contexts have directly addressed 
the impacts of particularized trust on grassroots governance. 
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 In sum, we develop two directional hypotheses with regard to the impacts of generalized 
trust and particularized trust on rural governance in China: 
 Hypothesis 1: Villages with higher levels of generalized trust tend to have better 
grassroots governance.  
 Hypothesis 2: Villages with higher levels of particularized trust tend to have better 
grassroots governance. 
 Our hypotheses are directional in that, as elaborated above, if the two forms of social 
trust render any significant influence, the influence should be positive given the particular 
socioeconomic environment in rural China.  We find no reasons to conceive detrimental effects 
of social trust on rural governance. 
 
4.3. Control Variables 
 In order to test the independent effects of the two types of social trust on rural public 
goods provision, this study incorporates five sets of sociopolitical and socioeconomic factors as 
control variables.  Specifically, these categories of control variables are formal institution (i.e., 
Village Representative Assembly), lineage groups as informal institutions, economic 
development, geographic/demographic traits, and regions (See Appendix B). 
 
 Village Representative Assembly.  The introduction of grassroots democracy is widely 
perceived to be positively correlated with public goods provision.  Besides VCs, the Organic 
Law also introduces the village assembly (VRAs) as a monitoring body to improve the rural 
governance.  The village assembly, composed of ordinary villagers, is supposed to check the 
power of VCs, particularly on the financial issues.  Therefore, the mode of selection of village 
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representatives in the assembly may affect the performance of VCs.  In this study, we identified 
the proportion of village representatives who are nominated and selected by villagers as a 
variable indicative of the quality of the village assembly.  However, it should be noted that until 
now there has been no consensus on the effectiveness of VRAs. 
 It should be noted that constrained by the available data, our operationalization of 
grassroots democracy in rural China is inevitably limited.  VRAs represent only one aspect of 
grassroots democracy and cannot be equated with its overall quality.  For instance, a key factor 
missed in this study is role of village party branches (VPBs).  As agents of the party-state, party 
secretaries are more responsive to upper-level governments than they are to the VCs.  The 
prominence of the VPB in village affairs therefore may endanger village self-governance. 
 Lineage Groups as Informal Institutions.  The quality of rural governance in China is also 
affected by social pressures arising from such solidary groups as lineage groups.  Tsai, for 
instance, found that lineage groups as informal institution can strongly influence the levels of 
public goods provisions. 48  We thus include a second set of control variables to represent the 
impacts of informal institutions.  Specifically, we include a dummy variable to denote the 
existence of well-organized clans in a village.49  We expect that the presence of lineage groups as 
informal institutions may help improve the public goods provision.   
 Economic Development.  The level of economic development is widely perceived to be 
one of the determinants of public goods provisions.  As the level of economic development rises, 
a village ought to have more resources available for improvement of public goods and services.  
Thus, wealthy villages are more likely to have adequate public goods and services.  To gauge the 
level of economic development, we employ village income per capita.  In addition, to capture the 
level of industrialization of each village, which is related to the level of economic development, 
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we also incorporate a dummy variable for the existence of village enterprises, which are market-
oriented and collectively owned enterprises under the purview of village governments. 
 Geographic and Demographic Traits.  The geographic and demographic variables in this 
study include village population, the number of natural villages under one VC, the education 
level, and the distance from the county seat.  All of these variables may have some implications 
for public goods provision.  For example, a larger population always increases demands of public 
goods provision.  Moreover, in rural China not all villagers are leaving a common residential 
community.  Sometime, within the jurisdiction of an administrative village there are several 
naturally formed small residential communities.  The coexistence of several natural villages 
might significantly increase the costs of maintaining roads and bridges.  In addition, demand for 
public goods provision should be higher in village where the average education level is high, 
since well-educated individuals tend to have higher expectations of the quality of life.  Proximity 
to county seat might be negatively correlated with demands of better education and medical 
services, since individuals could easily travel to county sites for such services.   
 Controls at the Province Level.  Regional diversity and disparity might also play a role in 
shaping public goods provision, since, for example, the resources and demands for public goods 
and services might vary by region due to their different economic, social and cultural conditions.  
In this study, therefore, we use three key controls at the provincial level to address the variations 
which result from regional differences, such as percentage of rural population, average 
disposable income of rural household, and province¶s reliance on agricultural and arable land 
occupation tax.  Although far from being comprehensive, these provincial-level variables, we 
believe, can reveal important regional differences. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 In order to explore the effects of the two types of social trust on village public goods 
provision, we employ a multilevel approach (see Table 4).  The key feature that distinguishes the 
multilevel model from the classical regression models is the modeling of variation between 
groups (in our study, the provinces).  Scholars have long noticed that depending on the local 
context, public goods provision FRXOGYDU\VXEVWDQWLDOO\HYHQZLWKLQRQHFRXQWU\3XWQDP¶V
canonical work on Italy, for example, reveals that the different cultural and historical heritages of 
the North and South of Italy have fundamentally shaped the disparity of public services in the 
country.50  Similarly, scholars have frequently emphasized the significant impacts of the local 
contexts on various sociopolitical phenomena in China.51  Moreover, &KLQD¶VUDSLGEXWXQHYHQ 
economic growth has significantly increased the regional disparity, making the impacts of local 
contexts even more prominent.  Compared to single-level, no-pooling (e.g., province- or region-
based) and pooling analyses, multilevel analysis allows for a more accurate estimation of the 
additive effects of both the individual and contextual correlates, and thus is more reliable than 
single-level analysis in exploring the correlates of public goods provision in rural China.   
 Specifically in this study, we adopt the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Bayesian 
analysis.  Unlike maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, Bayesian estimation holds no strong 
assumption about sampling distribution and thus is much less biased.  Stegmueller¶s recent 
systematic comparison further reveals that Bayesian estimation is not only less biased but also 
more rigorous (i.e. more conservative) than ML estimation.52  Moreover, to ensure the robustness 
of our analyses, we test the hypotheses by varying the measurement for the dependent variable 
(i.e., public goods provision).  A combination of these strategies, we believe, renders a rigorous 
empirical test for the hypotheses regarding the impacts of social trust.   
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[Table 4 is about here.] 
 Table 4 reports the results of the Bayesian estimates of the model specified above, and 
several important findings stand out.  First, the particularized trust had a significant and positive 
impact on village pubic goods provision.  Even when we control for generalized trust, the quality 
of formal institutions, informal institutions, economic development, and other demographic and 
geographic factors at the individual and provincial level, the estimated effect of particularized 
trust is still positive and significant for two out of three direct measures of public goods 
provision (i.e., expenditure on social welfare and agricultural infrastructure).  Moreover, the 
findings also suggest that villages with higher levels of particularized trust tend to have a higher 
share of public goods expenditure (measured in social welfare and agricultural infrastructure) 
within their total spending.  In sharp contrast, generalized trust is not significantly associated 
with village public goods provision.  The measure of generalized trust yields no substantial 
impact on our four measures of public goods.  These results suggest that the level of generalized 
trust in a village does not influence the quality of pubic goods provision.   
 Second, the results of this study do not support the argument that the VRAs can 
effectively improve public goods provision in rural China.  The estimated effects of the 
percentage of elected village representatives are not statistically significant.  These findings 
suggest that variations in composition of VRAs do not make a significant difference on public 
goods provision.  This confirms some anecdotal observations about ineffectiveness of VRAs.53  
As for the overall impact of grassroots democracy, we do not have a full answer to this question 
due to the lack of empirical data.  To do so, more comprehensive operationalization of grassroots 
democracy is required.  
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 Third, the presence of lineage groups, as informal institutions, has no substantial impact 
on village public goods provision.  Not only are the signs of the estimated effects mixed, but 
their estimated effects are not statistically significant.  These findings call into question the thesis 
of the VROLGDU\JURXSWKDW³WKHULJKWNLQGRIVRFLDOJURXSV´LVWKHNH\GHWHUPLQDQWRISXEOLFJRRGV
provision.54  It is quite possible that social trust makes informal institutions effective, since most 
solidary groups are in fact deeply rooted in strongly particularized trust among villagers.55  Yet 
this requires further empirical research to untangle the relationship between social trust and 
informal institutions.   
 Fourth, the results also reveal that the levels of economic development have a significant 
DQGSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQSXEOLFJRRGVSURYLVLRQ7KHHVWLPDWHGHIIHFWVRIYLOODJHUV¶LQFRPHDQG
village-owned enterprises are positive and significant for tap water coverage.  Moreover, villages 
with village-owned enterprises tend to spend on more social welfare.  One possible explanation 
is that villages with village-owned enterprises can use their revenues to fund public projects like 
tap water system directly, and voluntary fund raising becomes unnecessary.  For villagers, 
economic development not only increases their demands for better public goods provisions, but 
also provides them with more resources to meet these demands.  In other words, economically 
more developed villages are less dependent on particularized trust to improve local governance, 
and thus are more likely to cultivated generalized trust.  These findings, to certain extent, 
confirm the modernization thesis that economic development comes in tandem with profound 
social changes.  
 Last but not least, the results in Table 4 confirm our expectations about the sheer regional 
differences in public goods provision.  Specifically, the findings reveal that provinces with lower 
levels of urbanization tend to have smaller tap water coverage, which in turn suggest that the 
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urbanization process strongly shapes the provision of such public goods as tap water.  Moreover, 
our analysis indicates that provinces which relied more on agricultural taxes had a lower level of 
public goods provision in areas such as social welfare and agricultural infrastructure.  State 
extraction, therefore, may constrain public goods provision in rural China.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 Grassroots governance is deeply embedded in social relations.  7KHUHIRUHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
basic perception of each other can strongly affect various sociopolitical outcomes, and such 
mechanisms take place not only in democratic settings.  This study finds that in China, one of 
most resilient authoritarian regimes in the world, the levels of social trust expressed by rural 
residents are strongly associated with the public goods provision at the local level.  Specifically, 
ZHILQGWKDWLQ&KLQHVHYLOODJHUV¶PLQGs, the two kinds of social trust, particularized trust and 
generalized trust, are clearly differentiated.  In addition, these two types of social trust exert 
different impacts on rural governance: WKHUHDVYLOODJHUV¶WUXVWLQSHRSOHZKRPWKH\SHUVRQDOO\
know was positively and significantly associated with the provision of various public goods and 
services, their trust in strangers virtually has almost no impact on such provision. 
 The findings of this study have several important implications.  First, these findings 
indicate that it would be misleading to assume a linear relationship between social trust and 
democracy.  High levels of social trust not only help democracy work, but also make non-
democracies function.  Moreover, since in non-democratic settings ordinary people cannot rely 
on formal political institutions to achieve better governance, dense trust among them seems to be 
an option they have.56  Thus it is reasonable to infer that the role of social trust might be even 
more important in non-democracies for the wellbeings of ordinary people.  By the same token, 
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this study calls for more research on the way in which social trust affect governance in non-
democratic settings.  
 Second, the empirical findings here also suggest that the roles of different types of social 
trust in local governance are far more complicated than we early thought.  Specifically, 
particularized trust is not necessarily associated with ³G\VIXQFWLRQDOFRPPXQLWLHV.´57  Instead, 
with common interests at stake, particularized trust might be conducive to local governance.  By 
contrast, the role of generalized trust might be overstated, particularly with regard to local 
governance.   
 Third, the important role of economic development revealed in this study points to 
another avenue to better grassroots governance.  Economically more developed villages are not 
constrained by the reservoir of particularized trust to provide public services.  This in turn 
implies that further economic development in rural China can make particularized trust 
increasingly irrelevant in grassroots governance.  Moreover, economic modernization can also 
create fertile ground for the emergence of more inclusive forms of social trust (i.e., generalized 
trust).  In the long run, the radius and level of social trust in rural China will continue to 
experience noteworthy changes.    
 Finally, the findings of this study also have important methodological implications for 
survey-based studies of social trust.  Since social trust is an inherently multi-dimensional 
concept, it might be problematic to rely on a single measure to gauge social trust.  To ensure the 
validity of comparative political studies of social trust, researchers should be more careful in 
selecting their specific measures.  As a preliminary effort, our study is inevitably limited in its 
revealing of the complex nature of social trust and grassroots governance in rural China.  
Specifically, our retrospective factor analysis reveals that generalized trust is associated only 
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ZLWKDVLQJOHVRFLDOFDWHJRU\RI³VWUDQJHUV.´ Such lopsidedness could affect the validity and 
comparability of the two measurements.  In addition, constrained by the available data, our 
operationalized of grassroots democracy is also limited.  More comprehensive studies are thus 
called for to explore how social trust and grassroots democracy jointly affect grassroots 
governance in rural China.  
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Table 1.  Summary of Dependent Variables: Rural Public Goods Provision in China 
 
 N. Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Percentage of households with tap 
    water 
394 0 100 46.7 44.41 
Expenditure on social welfare (RMB 
    per capita) 
375 0 714.3 5.5 43.82 
Expenditure on agricultural  
    infrastructure (RMB per capita) 
378 0 312.5 4.8 19.78 
Expenditure on administrative costs  
    (RMB per capita) 
357 0 4187.9 32.6 225.4 
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Table 2.  The Distribution of Different Types of Social Trust in Rural China 
 
 
Relatives and 
Close Friends 
Neighbors Non-Neighbors 
Villagers of 
Same Surname 
Villagers of  
Diff. Surname 
Strangers 
 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Most of them can be  
    trusted (5) 
2429 57.0 1923 45.0 1158 27.1 1390 32.8 1059 25.0 54 1.3 
More than half of them  
    can be trusted (4) 
1459 34.3 1721 40.3 1883 44.1 1877 44.3 1770 41.8 188 4.5 
Half of them can be  
    trusted (3) 
317 7.4 470 11.0 939 22.0 784 18.5 1104 26.0 862 20.5 
More than half cannot  
    be trusted (2) 
44 1.0 130 3.0 249 5.8 160 3.8 253 6.0 1184 28.1 
Most cannot be trusted  
    (1) 
10 .2 26 .6 41 1.0 27 .6 53 1.3 1924 45.7 
 
            
Mean Score 4.47 4.26 3.91 4.05 3.83 1.88 
Standard Deviation .699 .818 .896 .848 .913 .970 
N. of observations 4259 4270 4270 4238 4239 4212 
 
 
.
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Table 3.  Factor Analysis of Social Trust Items 
 
Items 
Particularized Trust 
Factor 1 
Generalized Trust 
Factor 2 
Trust in villagers of the same surnames  .846  
Trust in non-neighboring villagers .812  
Trust in neighboring villagers .808  
Trust in villagers of different surnames .805  
Trust in relatives .607  
Trust in strangers  .950 
 
Note: Figures in this table are factor loadings of .25 or larger from the varimax rotated matrix for 
all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. 
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Table 4.  Social Trust and Pubic Goods Provision in Rural China: Bayseian Multilevel 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Tap Water 
Coverage 
Social 
Welfare 
Agricul. 
Infrastr. 
Share of 
PG Exp. 
Particularized Trust 
-0.0191 
(0.0211) 
0.0963** 
(0.0489) 
0.0472** 
(0.286) 
0.0052** 
(0.0030) 
Generalized Trust 
0.0025 
(0.0062) 
0.0284 
(0.0574) 
-0.0061 
(0.0132) 
-0.0019 
(0.0274) 
     
    Controls at the village level     
Elected village representatives (%) 
0.0161 
(0.0253) 
0.371 
(0.353) 
0.421 
(0.517) 
-0.0964 
(0.1732) 
Village election turnout rate 
-0.0120 
(0.0203) 
0.719 
(0.903) 
0.652 
(0.722) 
0.560 
(1.112) 
2QH,VVXH2QH'LVFXVVLRQ³Yishi  
    Yiyi´ 
0.0581 
(0.0340) 
0.149 
(0.346) 
0.281 
(0.697) 
0.0213 
(0.0391) 
Existence of lineage groups  
-0.0296 
(0.0315) 
-0.792 
(0.696) 
0.677 
(0.492) 
0.0242 
(0.0422) 
Largest surname (%) 
0.587 
(0.841) 
0.492 
(0.346) 
-0.112 
(0.341) 
0.619 
(1.352) 
Income per capita (log) 
0.969** 
(0.580) 
-0.682 
(0.531) 
0.0631 
(0.0773) 
0.151 
(0.683) 
Existence of village-owned  
    enterprise 
0.0297** 
(0.0149) 
0.515* 
(0.304) 
-0.0091 
(0.0127) 
0.0672 
(0.131) 
Population (log) 
-0.0113 
(0.0352) 
0.291 
(0.312) 
0.177 
(0.231) 
-0.334 
(0.821) 
Number of natural villages 
-0.0097 
(0.0174) 
0.736 
(0.797) 
-0.461 
(0.559) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0146) 
Distance from the site of township  
    government (km) 
-0.0029 
(0.0164) 
-0.0531 
(0.0503) 
0.065 
(0.1567) 
-0.0047 
(0.0041) 
Literacy rate 
0.350 
0.681 
0.927 
(1.544) 
0.454 
0.397 
0.482* 
(0.291) 
Arable land (mu per capita)   
0.260 
(0.159) 
0.0605 
(0.0823) 
     
    Controls at the provincial level     
Percentage of rural residents 
-0.119** 
(0.0719) 
0.107 
(0.0925) 
0.276 
(0.201) 
0.149 
(0.227) 
Annual disposable income of rural  
    residents (×10-3) 
0.0724 
(0.0452) 
-0.411 
(0.537) 
-0.026 
(0.215) 
0.0084 
(0.0277) 
Level of agricultural extractiona 
0.611 
(1.162) 
-0.581** 
(0.352) 
-0.612** 
(0.309) 
0.0823 
(0.588) 
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Constant 
0.0549*** 
(0.0221) 
0.233*** 
(0.103) 
0.251*** 
(0.0971) 
0.0601*** 
(0.0243) 
     
Ȟ2 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.032 
Ȟ1 0.114 0.102 0.092 0.108 
 
Note:  Entries are Bayesian multilevel coefficients (i.e., the average effects) and corresponding 
posterior deviations (in parentheses).  Datasets includes 399 villages in 24 provincial units.  **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01.  p value is calculated based on one-tailed test.  We use the package of R2MLwiN 
from within R for the Bayesian MCMC estimation.   
a  The levels of agricultural extraction are calculated by (agricultural tax + arable land occupation 
tax)/total provincial revenue.   
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Figure 1.  Contrasting Level of Generalized Trust and Trust Radius 
 
 
Note: 3DUWLFXODUL]HGWUXVWLVDQDGGLWLYHVFRUHFRPSXWHGEDVHGRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶WUXVWLQWKHLU
family, neighborhood, and people they know personally, and generalized trust is their trust in 
people they meet first time.  For each country, an individual-level regression model has been 
calculated, LQZKLFKWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVDUHVSRQGHQW¶VWUXVW in most people, and the 
independent variables are particularized and generalized trust.  The regression coefficients (b¶V
indicate the strength of the two associations for each country, and the difference between the two 
coefficients (bgeneralized ± bparticularized) can reveal the trust radius. 
The dotted lines represent the global mean. 
Source: WVS 5. 
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Appendix A:  The Survey and the Sample 
 The data used in this study are drawn from part of the China General Social Survey of 
rural residents and village governments which was carried out in twenty-four provincial units of 
China in 2005.  This survey was conducted by one of the most reputable academic survey 
research organizations in China, the Public Opinion Research Institute of Renmin University of 
China (PORI).  Embarking on a myriad of research purposes, the survey is designed to capture a 
comprehensive picture of rural China (with the exception of the two minority regions, Tibet and 
Uyghur).  The samples were selected with a combination of probability proportional to size 
(PPS) and multi-stage sampling techniques.  In the first stage, county-level units were selected 
within each provincial unit using the PPS technique, in which the probability of selection is 
SURSRUWLRQDOWRWKHSRSXODWLRQVL]HRIWKHSURYLQFHEDVHGRQ&KLQD¶VFHQVXVGDWD,QWKLV
sampling step, a total of 92 county-level units were randomly chosen.  In the second stage, a total 
number of 205 township-level units were randomly selected from the 92 country-level units.  In 
the third stage, within each township-level unit, two villages were randomly selected, and a total 
of 410 villages were randomly selected.  A sample of 4800 ordinary rural residents was 
randomly chosen.  A total of 4,253 individual-level questionnaires were completed, with a 
response rate of 88.6%.   
 Both the village-level and individual-level questionnaires were administered in the form 
of face-to-face interview.  Graduate students who were employed were trained by project 
personnel to conduct the interviews.  To assess the quality of the responses, interviewers were 
also asked to evaluate each respondent.  The results of the evaluations indicated that nearly all 
respondents were perceived to be cooperative (98.6%) and open (98.2%).   
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Appendix B:  Summary of Control Variables 
 
Items 
N. Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Quality of Formal Institutions      
Elected village representatives (%) 399 0 1 0.62 0.3 
Village election turnout rate 399 0 1 0.40 0.24 
2QH,VVXH2QH'LVFXVVLRQ³Yishi 
Yiyi´ 399 0 1 0.51 0.5 
      
Lineage Groups as Informal Institutions      
Existence of lineage groups  399 0 1 0.27 0.45 
Largest surname (%) 379 3 96 41.7 23 
      
Economic Development      
Income per capita (×10-3) 390 .05 7.40 1.90 1.24 
Existence of village-owned enterprise 394 0 1 0.15 0.33 
      
Geographic and Demographic Traits      
Population (×10-3) 395 0.15 16.5 2.15 1.74 
Number of natural villages 395 0 70 4.9 7.62 
Arable land (mu per capita)a      
Literacy rate 393 0.29 1 0.91 0.11 
Distance from the site of township 
government (km) 
395 0 38 5.7 5.3 
      
Controls at the provincial level      
Percentage of rural residentsb 31 0.22 0.85 0.673 0.156 
Annual disposable income of rural 
residents (×10-3)b 
31 1.72 7.07 3.16 1.36 
Agricultural tax (×10-9 RMB)c 31 0.0004 2.511 0.682 0.700 
Arable land occupation tax (×10-9 
RMB)c 
31 0.00045 2.137 0.387 0.517 
Total provincial revenue (×10-9 RMB)c 31 1.001 141.8 37.72 33.84 
 
Note:  
a  Calculated based on the total arable land and the size of labor force in a village.   
b  From National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2005).   
c  From Ministry of Agriculture, 2005 Agricultural Development Report (Beijing: China 
Agriculture Press, 2005). 
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Appendix C:  Additional Analysis with A Different Set of Controls 
 
 
Tap Water 
Coverage 
Social 
Welfare 
Agricul. 
Infrastr. 
Share of 
PG Exp. 
Particularized Trust 
-0.0191 
(0.0211) 
0.0963** 
(0.0489) 
0.0472** 
(0.0286) 
0.0052** 
(0.0030) 
Generalized Trust 
0.0025 
(0.0062) 
0.0284 
(0.0574) 
-0.0061 
(0.0132) 
-0.0019 
(0.0274) 
     
    Controls at the village level     
Elected village representatives (%) 
0.0161 
(0.0253) 
0.371 
(0.353) 
0.421 
(0.517) 
-0.0964 
(0.1732) 
Village election turnout rate 
-0.0120 
(0.0203) 
0.719 
(0.903) 
0.652 
(0.722) 
0.560 
(1.112) 
2QH,VVXH2QH'LVFXVVLRQ³Yishi  
    Yiyi´ 
0.0581 
(0.0340) 
0.149 
(0.346) 
0.281 
(0.697) 
0.0213 
(0.0391) 
Existence of lineage groups  
-0.0296 
(0.0315) 
-0.792 
(0.696) 
0.677 
(0.492) 
0.0242 
(0.0422) 
Largest surname (%) 
0.587 
(0.841) 
0.492 
(0.346) 
-0.112 
(0.341) 
0.619 
(1.352) 
Income per capita (log) 
0.969** 
(0.580) 
-0.682 
(0.531) 
0.0631 
(0.0773) 
0.151 
(0.683) 
Existence of village-owned  
    enterprise 
0.0297** 
(0.0149) 
0.515* 
(0.304) 
-0.0091 
(0.0127) 
0.0672 
(0.131) 
Population (log) 
-0.0113 
(0.0352) 
0.291 
(0.312) 
0.177 
(0.231) 
-0.334 
(0.821) 
Number of natural villages 
-0.0097 
(0.0174) 
0.736 
(0.797) 
-0.461 
(0.559) 
-0.0242* 
(0.0146) 
Distance from the site of township  
    government (km) 
-0.0029 
(0.0164) 
-0.0531 
(0.0503) 
0.065 
(0.1567) 
-0.0047 
(0.0041) 
Literacy rate 
0.350 
0.681 
0.927 
(1.544) 
0.454 
0.397 
0.482* 
(0.291) 
Arable land (mu per capita)   
0.260 
(0.159) 
0.0605 
(0.0823) 
     
    Controls at the provincial level     
Percentage of rural residents 
-0.119** 
(0.0719) 
0.107 
(0.0925) 
0.276 
(0.201) 
0.149 
(0.227) 
Annual disposable income of rural  
    residents (×10-3) 
0.0724 
(0.0452) 
-0.411 
(0.537) 
-0.026 
(0.215) 
0.0084 
(0.0277) 
Level of agricultural extractiona 
0.611 
(1.162) 
-0.581** 
(0.352) 
-0.612** 
(0.309) 
0.0823 
(0.588) 
     
Constant 
0.0549*** 
(0.0221) 
0.233*** 
(0.103) 
0.251*** 
(0.0971) 
0.0601*** 
(0.0243) 
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Ȟ2 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.032 
Ȟ1 0.114 0.102 0.092 0.108 
 
Note:  Entries are Bayesian multilevel coefficients (i.e., the average effects) and corresponding 
posterior deviations (in parentheses).  Datasets includes 399 villages in 24 provincial units.  **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01.  p value is calculated based on one-tailed test.  We use the package of R2MLwiN 
from within R for the Bayesian MCMC estimation.   
a  The levels of agricultural extraction are calculated by (agricultural tax + arable land occupation 
tax)/total provincial revenue.   
 
